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†
 
David Fontana 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the central questions raised by comparative constitutional law is 
whether the American constitutional system is somehow different, or even 
exceptional, when compared to the systems of other countries.  As Stephen 
Gardbaum has written, ―even within the common framework of . . . modern 
constitutional fundamentals, there is still a pervasive sense that the United 
States remains broadly exceptional or different.‖1  Whatever the veracity of 
this conventional wisdom as applied to the rest of the American system, it is 
undeniably true that the events that dominated the United States in the 
months after the election of Barack Obama on November 4, 2008—the 
events related to the presidential transition—are a uniquely American dra-
ma. 
The phenomenon of the transition between elected governments—a 
time where one political leader or party has already been elected but has not 
yet taken official power—is not unknown to the rest of the world, and 
seems specifically contemplated by the constitutions of other countries.2  
What makes the American system unique, then, is not the existence of the 
transition period, but its significance.  In the major constitutional regimes 
 
 
 
†
  This essay was previously published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on Feb. 
23, 2009, as David Fontana, The Permanent and Presidential Transition Models of Political Party Poli-
cy Leadership, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 393 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/colloquy/2009/12/. 

  Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  Thank you to the edi-
tors of the Northwestern University Law Review for inviting me to write this Essay for their colloquy on 
presidential transitions, and to Alissa Ardito, Stephen Galoob, Seth Grossman, Matthew Lindsay, Chip 
Lupu, Karen Lyons, Peter Smith, and Brad Snyder for their comments. 
1
  Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 391, 394 (2008). 
2
  For instance, the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic seems to contemplate the possibility of 
a period of transition between elected regimes.  See 1958 CONST. art. 7, § 3 (Fr.) (stating that the elec-
tion of the new President shall take place not less than twenty days and not more than thirty-five days 
before the expiry of the powers of the President in office).   
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elsewhere, political parties more clearly identify their policy leaders even 
when not in power, and thus have a much smaller number of personnel de-
cisions to make when transitioning to power.3  By contrast, American polit-
ical parties do not clearly identify who their policy leaders are when they do 
not occupy the White House.  Because of that, and because American Pres-
idents have such a large number of political appointments to make, the tran-
sition period becomes a crucial moment for the new American President to 
coronate a select few political figures as the current and future political and 
policy leaders within his Administration, and therefore within his party.  
The contrast leads to a simple, but significant, difference: While political 
parties in other countries define their policy leaders permanently, American 
parties define their policy leaders in substantial part through a singular mo-
ment of high drama—the presidential transition.   
Part I of this Essay discusses how political parties outside of the United 
States define the policy leaders of their parties.  The process used by the 
world‘s other major constitutional democracies—a process that transpires 
even when a party is out of power and is only a minimal part of the transi-
tion to power—is called the ―permanent‖ model of selecting the leaders of 
political parties.  Part II then turns to the American regime, which this Es-
say calls the ―presidential transition‖ model of political party leadership se-
lection because this process is centered around the process of presidential 
transitions. 
I. THE PERMANENT MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERSHIP 
For anxious and long-suffering members of the Democratic Party, the 
calendar year 2008 was an exhilarating, but gradual, thrill.  First came the 
competition between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama for the Democratic 
Party nomination for President; then came the Denver Convention; and fi-
nally came the electricity among Democrats the night of the election, when 
Obama‘s victory became certain.  But if that was a gradual thrill, then the 
period following Obama‘s election on November 4, 2008, leading up to the 
inauguration of President Obama on January 20, 2009, was more of a tem-
porary rush.  Aspiring Democratic policy leaders met with old friends and 
new allies by the dozens and hundreds every week, trying to position them-
selves for leading roles in the new Obama Administration and therefore 
within the Democratic Party for years to come.  This rush of the American 
transition to power, then, is the feeling that comes with being a part of a 
sprint, and not a marathon.   
 
 
 
3
  In this Essay, I discuss the policy leadership of political parties, not the general leadership of par-
ties.  The permanent—more purely political and strategic—staff of parties are selected in more similar 
manners in the United States as compared to the rest of the world.  The major difference comes when 
parties select who will lead their portfolios on particular policy issues, and one manner in which they 
select those leaders is through cabinet and other appointments. 
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If the presidential transition in the United States is a sprint, then the 
process of selecting the current and future political and policy leaders of the 
party in the other major constitutional democracies around the world is 
more of a marathon.  When out of power, political parties in other nations 
clearly define their policy leaders.  When transitioning to power, these pre-
defined leaders usually assume positions in government, and there are very 
few other coronations of new leaders taking place because of the paucity of 
political appointments the new leader gets to make.  
When out of power, it is quite common in all forms of constitutional 
systems for the political parties out of power to clearly identify which (se-
nior and junior) members of their parties will lead the party in certain policy 
areas.4  This is particularly so in dozens of British-inspired parliamentary 
systems, but is also true of parties out of power in semi-presidential and 
presidential systems.  In presidential Argentina, for instance, the opposition 
party chairs and controls a certain number of legislative committees.5  In 
choosing who will chair these committees, then, political parties often 
clearly indicate who their party‘s leaders are on certain policy issues, be-
cause parties have enormous influence on which member of their opposi-
tion caucus will receive these coveted committee chair positions.  Likewise, 
political parties in semi-presidential systems (such as France) have also of-
ten clearly defined their policy leaders even when out of power.6 
Members of opposition political parties will often be assigned a ―Sha-
dow Cabinet‖ position, whereby they essentially mimic the policy portfolio 
of an official cabinet agency.7  Not only are there shadow cabinet minis-
ters—officials with some national prominence already, or at least the noto-
riety roughly equivalent to that of a real cabinet minister—but there are 
more junior officials who work with the shadow cabinet ministers.8   
These positions of party policy leadership are more than just empty 
titles; they also come with real policy leadership responsibilities, and a se-
ries of special entitlements recognized by law.  In parliamentary systems, 
for instance, when a cabinet minister or other policy leader from the go-
 
 
 
4
  In parliamentary systems, a singular vote is cast for a party, and the party then selects the leader of 
the country; and in presidential systems, separate votes are cast for the directly elected executive and 
members of the legislative body.  A semi-presidential system ―combines a popularly elected head of 
state with a head of government who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature.‖  See Cindy 
Skach, The “Newest” Form of Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INT‘L J. CONST. L 93, 93 
(2007).   
5
  See Mark P. Jones & Wonjae Hwang, Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending 
Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 267, 277 (2005). 
6
  In semi-presidential France, François Mitterrand appointed leaders within his party in different 
policy areas—what was called the ―counter-government‖ rather than the shadow cabinet—in 1966.  See 
SERGE BERSTEIN, THE REPUBLIC OF DE GAULLE, 1958–1969, at 204 (Peter Morris trans., 1993).   
7
  See, e.g., Nevil Johnson, Opposition in the British Political System, 32 GOV‘T & OPPOSITION 487, 
488–89, 493–96 (1997) (describing this process in the British system, which formed the basis for many 
other shadow cabinets). 
8
  Id. at 493–94. 
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verning party or another party appears before the legislature, his shadow 
minister counterpart leads the questioning of the governmental minister.9  
The shadow minister and junior ministers produce position papers identify-
ing their party‘s position on certain issues and submit requests for informa-
tion to the government on behalf of their party.10   
In countries without these versions of shadow governments, political 
parties have still transformed into ―cartel parties‖—parties in which there is 
an ―ever closer symbiosis between parties and the state,‖11 and they have an 
―increasing orientation towards, and dependence upon, the state as an insti-
tutional support structure.‖12  One way that cartel parties use the institution-
al support of the state—in presidential as well as parliamentary regimes—is 
that even when in opposition, they will be granted control of certain arms of 
the government.  For instance, as in presidential Argentina13 or parliamenta-
ry Germany,14 opposition political parties are often given the power to ac-
tually chair legislative committees—which allows them to designate the 
chair of that committee—a party leader in that area of policy.  There are en-
tire legal regimes created to support the operations of these permanent poli-
cy leaders in opposition parties.  In Great Britain, for instance, there are 
specific funds to support the operations of opposition parties in both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords.15 
When this party in opposition wins an election, and becomes the go-
verning majority, the transition to power is not as significant a moment in 
defining the policy leadership of the party as it is in the United States.  First, 
there is already a bench of shadow ministers, shadow junior ministers, op-
position party committee chairs, and even younger policy officials, all of 
whom are ready to transition to the same or a similar position in govern-
ment after their party wins an election.  Second, even if, as is the case in 
some countries, there is no shadow government or opposition-led arms of 
the government—and the newly elected leader has to determine for the first 
time who he wants to appoint to every single cabinet position—there are 
 
 
 
9
  See SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, ERSKINE MAY‘S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, 
PROCEEDINGS AND USAGES OF PARLIAMENT 252–53 (20th ed., Butterworths 1983).  
10
  See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS INFORMATION OFFICE, PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS, FACTSHEET 
P1 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/p01.pdf; MAY, supra note 9, 
at 331–47. 
11
  Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: 
The Emergence of the Cartel Party, 1 PARTY POL. 5, 6 (1995). 
12
  Aleks Szczerbiak, Cartelisation in Post-Communist Politics: State Party Funding in Post-1989 
Poland, in PAN-EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON PARTY POLITICS 127, 128 (Paul Lewis & Paul Webb eds., 
2003).   
13
  See Jones & Hwang, supra note 5, at 277. 
14
  See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, COMMITTEES IN 
LEGISLATURES: A DIVISION OF LABOR 16 (1996), available at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/ 
files/030_ww_committees.pdf. 
15
  See RICHARD KELLY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, SHORT MONEY 7–9 (2008), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-01663.pdf (link). 
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very few other personnel decisions that have to be made after national elec-
tions.  The reality of the American ―politicized presidency‖16 is that ―[t]he 
United States has a far larger number of political appointees than any other 
industrialized democracy.‖17  The exact numbers vary based on what criteria 
are used to determine who constitutes a political appointee, but some esti-
mates suggest that the American President makes almost 8,000 political ap-
pointments,18 while incoming national leaders in comparable democracies 
like Britain and France make just a few hundred political appointments.19  
By any measure, this difference is staggering.  In France, there are 5 million 
federal public servants,20 and just between 100 and 200 political appoint-
ments for the new President to make.  In the United States, there are 1.8 
million federal public servants,21 and the President makes almost 8,000 ap-
pointments.  France has nearly three times as many federal public servants 
as the United States, but just about 1% or 2% of the number of presidential 
appointees. 
This is not to say, of course, that the selection of party policy leaders 
for incoming governments in other countries is purely gradual and is entire-
ly unaffected by particular events that accelerate turnover in party policy 
leadership.  Even in countries with a more permanent mode of selecting po-
litical party leaders, elections still do have a large impact on the policy lea-
dership of the new government.  Countries with shadow governments will 
often displace or reassign some policy leaders after they win national elec-
tions.  After Kevin Rudd‘s win in the 2007 elections in Australia, for in-
stance, Rudd removed six ministers from his shadow cabinet who were 
slated to be in the leadership of the Rudd Government, and reassigned four 
 
 
 
16
  See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
235, 235 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985). 
17
  Shankar Vedantam, Who Are the Better Managers—Political Appointees or Career Bureau-
crats?, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2008, at A6. 
18
  See WILLIAM S. DIETRICH, IN THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN 185 (1991). 
19
  See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 3 (2008).  In Germany, as one specific illustration, when the Social 
Democratic and Green Parties (together called the Red-Green coalition) led by Gerhard Schroeder took 
control from the Christian Democrats in 1998, ―[t]he incoming government had a total of 136 senior 
administrative posts designated [for political appointment].‖  Eckhard Schroter, The Politicization of the 
German Civil Service: A Three-Dimensional Portrait of the Ministerial Bureaucracy, in 
POLITICIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 55, 71 (B. Guy Peters & Jon 
Pierre eds., 2004).   
20
  See Luc Rouban, Politicization of the Civil Service in France: From Structural to Strategic Poli-
ticization 81, 83–84, in POLITICIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 19.   
21
  See PAUL C. LIGHT, A GOVERNMENT ILL EXECUTED: THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE 
AND HOW TO REVERSE IT 101 (2008).   
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members of his shadow cabinet to different positions in the governing cabi-
net.22   
Likewise, in countries where the governing majority is supplied by a 
coalition of political parties rather than by a single party, the results of the 
elections will determine which parties—and which leaders of which 
parties—will join the governing cabinet, and therefore which political 
figures take leadership positions in certain policy areas.  In Israel, for 
example, the party receiving the most votes in the 2006 election was the 
Kadima Party, led by incumbent and current Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert, which received 29 out of 120 seats in the Israeli Knesset.23  Olmert 
needed other parties to join his coalition, and because the Labour Party did 
well enough during that election, Olmert asked them to join his coalition—
and assigned Labour Party leader (and former Labour Prime Minister) Ehud 
Barak the important position of Defense Minister in the Kadima/Olmert 
Government.24  This meant that, because of the results of the 2006 Israeli 
election, Barak reemerged as a major figure in his party‘s leadership on de-
fense issues. 
But while elections sometimes lead to decisions about political party 
leadership outside of the United States, it certainly happens much less fre-
quently than in the United States.  After all, while Kevin Rudd replaced six 
ministers of his shadow cabinet for the first Rudd Ministry, he still left se-
venteen out of his twenty-three shadow ministers in place.25  An American 
President would have had to determine who all twenty-three members of his 
cabinet would be.  And Rudd did not have to appoint anywhere near the ap-
proximately 8,000 new leaders of his new government that President Ob-
ama had to appoint.  In other words, for the incoming government, the 
leaders of its various policy portfolios are affected by specific events—and 
in particular by the election bringing that party to power—but nowhere near 
to the extent as in the United States. 
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION MODEL OF                                   
POLITICAL PARTY LEADERSHIP 
In the American system, the party coming into power in the White 
House defines its policy leaders much more based on a singular event, the 
presidential election and then the transition period before the president-elect 
 
 
 
22
  See Rudd‟s First Ministry Mixes Old and New, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD ONLINE, Nov. 29, 
2007, http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Rudds-first-ministry-mixes-old-andnew/2007/11/29/119 
6037023340.html; Rudd Hands Out Portfolios, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Nov. 29, 2007, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/minlist.pdf. 
23
  See Greg Myre, Premier-Elect in Israel Closer to a Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A8. 
24
  See Isabel Kershner, Ex-Premier of Israel Takes Helm of Labour Party, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 
2007, at A19. 
25
  See Rudd‟s First Ministry Mixes Old and New, supra note 22; Rudd Hands Out Portfolios, supra 
note 22; Parliament of Australia: Who‘s Who, http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/minlist.pdf (list-
ing the members of Rudd‘s ministry as of September 15, 2008). 
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takes office on January 20.  When out of power, the policy leadership of 
this party is less clearly defined.26  When transitioning to power the new 
President also has to make thousands of appointments that will determine 
who many of the policy leaders of his party will be.  The result is a concen-
trated burst of activity in appointing the policy leaders of the Administra-
tion, and therefore a concentrated period of activity defining who will be 
the policy leadership of the party controlling the White House. 
When American political parties do not control the White House, poli-
cy leadership in those parties is contested and fragmented.27  One claim for 
the policy leadership in a party comes from the party‘s leadership in Con-
gress.  If that party does not control the White House, but controls one or 
both houses of Congress, that party will have congressional leaders who 
claim to be the party‘s leader on certain policy issues.  In the American sys-
tem, where congressional committees are quite powerful,28 the chairs of par-
ticular committees in Congress might claim to be their party‘s leaders on 
policy issues when their party is in the legislative majority.  Barney Frank 
(D-MA), as Committee Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, 
became one of the leading left-of-center voices articulating the Democratic 
Party‘s suggested response to the financial crisis in the fall of 2008.29  Nan-
cy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, and Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader, 
can make claims to be the leaders of the Democratic Party on a wide range 
of issues.  Even when in the legislative minority, the ranking members of 
the opposition party on a congressional committee—as well as the House 
Minority Leader and Senate Minority Leader—have claims to their party‘s 
general leadership.  And, regardless of whether their party is in the legisla-
tive majority or legislative minority, members of Congress who do not have 
particularly senior status on a committee but have a general notable national 
reputation (Hillary Clinton during her time in the Senate, or Robert F. Ken-
 
 
 
26
  Stuart Benjamin and G. Mitu Gulati have argued that presidential nominees should indicate dur-
ing campaigns whom they will nominate to their cabinet.  See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & G. 
Mitu Gulai, Mr. Presidential Candidate: Whom Would You Nominate? (Duke Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 213, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155222. 
27
  See Nicol C. Rae, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Rise of Responsible Parties in American 
National Politics, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 169, 170 (2007) (―In the comparative study of political parties 
in twentieth-century advanced democracies, the United States has always been something of a proble-
matic outlier owing to the absence of organized, disciplined, and ideological mass political parties.‖). 
28
  See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987). 
29
  For the first time, then, Frank became the focus of a number of lengthy profiles in major media 
outlets.  See Jeffrey Toobin, Barney‟s Great Adventure: The Most Outspoken Man in the House Gets 
Some Real Power, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 2009, at 37, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2009/01/12/090112fa_fact_toobin; Michelle Cottle, Bailout: The Redemption of Barney 
Frank, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 3, 2008,  at 23, available at http://www.tnr.com/politics/ 
story.html?id=1367a1e5-6575-4ee9-b011-8826cc7a09b5; Barney Frank on Bailouts, Welfare, 60 Mi-
nutes, Dec. 14, 2008,  http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/11/60minutes/main4663945.shtml (dis-
cussing 60 Minutes story about Frank). 
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nedy) might also have claims to be their party‘s policy leader on issues of 
particular interest to them. 
The party that does not control the White House might also have policy 
leaders who do not occupy any elected office.  Cabinet officials from pre-
vious Administrations might make claims to be one of their party‘s policy 
leaders; think, for example, of the leadership role that William Perry, Secre-
tary of Defense during former President Bill Clinton‘s Administration, 
plays on defense issues.30  The head of the political party organization itself 
might have a plausible claim to be a leader within the party.  For instance, 
Howard Dean might have had a claim to be one of the leaders of the Demo-
cratic Party because of his position as head of the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC). 
During the presidential campaign season, the leading presidential can-
didates also have claims to be their party‘s policy leaders.  If you wanted to 
know the Democratic Party‘s position on health care in 2008, earlier in the 
year you would have consulted both the Clinton and Obama plans.  After 
the party primaries are resolved, and a single individual becomes the party‘s 
nominee, the nominee has an even stronger claim to be a party or policy 
leader.  For example, after becoming the Democratic nominee for President, 
but before being elected, Obama accompanied Barney Frank, Nancy Pelosi, 
and other Democratic congressional leaders at the White House for the 
meeting about the financial crisis on Thursday, September 25.31  This ex-
tends to the presidential nominee‘s advisors as well.  One of Obama‘s chief 
foreign policy advisors, Susan Rice—also a former Clinton Administration 
Assistant Secretary of State—became a leading voice for the Democratic 
Party in 2008 on foreign policy issues as a key member of the Obama cam-
paign‘s foreign policy team.32   
When a political party is out of power in the White House, then, the 
American system muddles the definition of the policy leaders of the politi-
cal parties.  This has much to do with the horizontal (separation of powers) 
and vertical (federalist) fragmentation of powers in the American system.  
Party leadership is fragmented because it is multipolar.  The vertical separa-
tion of powers means that parties have policy leaders who are currently or 
have been in the past members of one of many branches of the federal gov-
ernment.  Federalism creates the potential for successful and entrepreneurial 
governors to claim leadership roles in their party‘s efforts on certain poli-
cies.33  Federalism also means that political parties are not singular entities, 
 
 
 
30
  See Posting of Michael Falcone to The Caucus, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/ 
obama-convenes-national-security-team/?scp=2&sq=%22william%20perry%22&st=cse (June 18, 2008, 
16:39 EST). 
31
  See Toobin, supra note 29. 
32
  See Russell Berman, Meet Obama‟s „Tenacious,‟ „Take Charge‟ Dr. Rice, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 28, 
2008, at 1. 
33
  See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the War on 
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1286 (2004) (―In America . . . , the party that is ‗out‘ in Washington 
103:1993  (2009) Permanent and Presidential Transition Models 
 2001 
but instead collections of fifty state parties loosely tied together into a na-
tional party.34 
This fragmentation in party leadership is substantially mitigated when 
and if a party in opposition elects one of its own as President.  During the 
campaign, the future President relies on current and past party leaders for 
advice and support, but rarely if ever does a presidential candidate indicate 
who he would like in his cabinet.35  After being elected, though, the presi-
dential nominee then has to decide which one among these party notables 
represents the kind of policy leadership he wants in his Administration.  
During the 2008 presidential campaign, for instance, the Democratic Party 
had no shadow secretary of state, so its leadership on foreign policy issues 
was fragmented and diverse.  Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair 
Joseph Biden was a voice of foreign policy leadership before becoming the 
nominee for Vice President in August of 2008.  Former Democratic Presi-
dential nominee and current Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts made 
it known that he wanted to become Secretary of State.36  But after being 
elected, President-Elect Obama had to choose his Secretary of State from 
among these and other policy leaders.  Because he had no shadow Secretary 
of State he had to decide who would be one of—if not the—chief Demo-
cratic Party voice on foreign policy.  
A few caveats are important to keep in mind.  First, in a fragmented 
system like the American system, the capacity of the President to choose 
nearly 8,000 individuals to take positions of leadership does not silence all 
other sources of potential party policy leadership.37  Particularly when the 
President‘s party also has majorities in Congress, there are other plausible 
sources of party policy leadership.  Because he was Chair of the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, the late Democratic 
                                                                                                                           
will almost certainly be ‗in‘ in at least a couple of dozen states and literally thousands of localities, and 
the experience of practical governance at those levels often provides the springboard for successful po-
litical takeovers at the national level.‖). 
34
  See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Fede-
ralism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (discussing the federal, decentralized nature of American politi-
cal parties). 
35
  While candidates essentially never provide anything more than generalities about who they will 
ask to be in their cabinet, George W. Bush indicated while campaigning in 2000 that he would ask Colin 
Powell to be Secretary of State if he were elected.  See Jamie McIntyre, Secretary Powell? Bush Hints at 
Former General‟s Role, CNN.COM, Aug. 1, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/ 
08/01/powell.state/index.html.  Bill Richardson promised that if he were the Democratic nominee for 
President in 2008, he would announce his whole cabinet in advance.  See Philip Elliott, Richardson 
Promises Cabinet Preview, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July 28, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/28/AR2007072800781_pf.html. 
36
  See Carl Hulse, Kerry, After Setbacks, Aims to Make a Mark as a Senate Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 13, 2009, at A12. 
37
  It is worth noting, too, that it is the President himself who has increasingly made appointments, 
not the parties.  See generally THOMAS J. WEKO, THE POLITICIZING PRESIDENCY: THE WHITE HOUSE 
PERSONNEL OFFICE, 1948–1994 (1995) (discussing the centralization of the appointments process in the 
White House through the White House Personnel Office).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
2002 
Senator Edward Kennedy might have had just as much of a leadership role 
on health care reform as Obama‘s Health and Human Services Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius did.  The power of the American President is not to elim-
inate other sources of party policy leadership, but to give one of his policy 
allies a potentially superior position of policy leadership.  Also, whatever 
power the President does have to elevate political figures into policy leader-
ship positions is not exercised solely at the time of the presidential transi-
tion.  Because political appointees tend not to remain in their appointed 
positions terribly long,38 the President will likely make other appointments 
throughout his Administration—but at nowhere near the pace of the presi-
dential transition period. 
The absence of a clearly defined policy leadership when parties do not 
occupy the White House—and the number of officials the President has to 
nominate—are part of the reason why presidential politics (and American 
presidential politics in particular) ―introduce[] a strong element of zero-sum 
game into democratic politics.‖39  There are longitudinal consequences—
many unique to the American version of presidentialism—that make the 
American presidential election a zero-sum game.  In the permanent model 
of political party leadership, senior officials have usually been a constant 
presence in the policy leadership of that country (often for their party, but 
sometimes even as part of the civil service or nonpartisan policy leader-
ship), gradually working their way up the party and policy ladder.40  If a se-
nior official is given a position in the American government, then he or she 
is in a prime position to be a policy leader in the party in the future—but 
one of their best chances to obtain a position in the government is if the 
President appoints them to a position.  Their cabinet experience might be a 
major credential for a later run even for an elective office like the presiden-
cy, as was the case for Bill Richardson during the Democratic primary race 
for the nomination in 2008.41   
When their party is out of power in the White House, though, there are 
fewer opportunities for political figures to assert policy leadership in their 
party than in other constitutional democracies.  They could run for Con-
 
 
 
38
  Most studies seem to indicate that political appointees last about two years in office.  See, e.g., 
ROBERT MARANTO, BEYOND A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS 29 (2005). 
39
  Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE 
FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3, 18 (Juan J. Linz & Arturo 
Valenzuela eds., 1994). 
40
  In France, for instance, ―[e]very President of the Republic (with the notable exception of François 
Mitterrand), every Prime Minister and most ministers were recruited from the ranks of the civil service; 
since 1958, the proportion of ministers coming from the public service has varied between 44 and 69 per 
cent, with an average of 52 per cent.‖  Rouban, supra note 20, at 84.   
41
  Richardson had been Secretary of Energy and Ambassador to the United Nations during the Clin-
ton Administration, and emphasized this experience as part of his campaign for the Democratic presi-
dential nomination.  See Ryan Lizza, Paper Candidate: Bill Richardson v. His Resume, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 29, available at http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=af68fef4-eb92-
473f-a0e4-77274017f75e. 
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gress or run for Governor (as Richardson did).42  But they do not have the 
opportunity to use shadow cabinets (as in Mitterand‘s France or British-
style parliamentary systems) or committee chair positions delegated to an 
opposition party (as in Argentina or Germany) to improve their credentials.  
If they are denied a cabinet position—and do not run for other office—then 
they will have far fewer, if any, chances to make nationally televised 
speeches articulating their party‘s position on policy issues and criticizing 
the policy positions of other parties.  There are less significant out-of-power 
positions for them to pursue—perhaps at an established think tank like the 
Center for American Progress43—but these institutions do not compare to 
the opposition institutions in other countries in terms of either the numbers 
of positions or their significance.  In other words, a presidential appoint-
ment is consequential because it provides a unique opportunity to be thrust 
into the policy limelight, an opportunity that is almost entirely missing 
when a political figure‘s party does not control the White House. 
The importance of a presidential appointment is even more dramatic 
for junior officials.  In other constitutional regimes, the ―Best and the 
Brightest‖44 do not migrate to the capital to work in the federal government 
following the election of a charismatic young leader like John F. Kennedy 
or Barack Obama; they already live and work in the federal government be-
cause there are many party leadership positions for figures from opposition 
parties.  For instance, right now, the Labour Party is in power in Great Brit-
ain, but the opposition Conservative Party has a shadow cabinet staffed by 
individuals of all levels of seniority and receives special funding.45  In addi-
tion, in the current British Parliament, opposition parties chair many com-
mittees,46 so aspiring operatives can also turn to committee staff positions 
even as members of the opposition party as a result.  When their party is out 
of power, then, the young and ambitious have more options to burnish their 
credentials. 
 
 
 
42
  A policy leader from the party out of power might be a sensible appointment to one of the federal 
agencies that mandates that a certain number of appointments be from opposing political parties.  See 
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent 
Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1135-38 (2000) (discussing the requirement in various 
agencies that there be a certain number of appointments from both major American political parties). 
43
  See Charlie Savage, John Podesta, Shepherd of a Government in Exile, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2008, at A22. 
44
  See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972) (discussing the wave 
of talented individuals who flocked to Washington, D.C., to work in the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis-
trations). 
45
  See Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1975, c. 27, § 1(1) & sched. 2, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1975/cukpga_19750027_en_1.   
46
  Labour currently holds nine committee chairs, while the Conservatives hold six chairs and the 
Liberal Democrats hold four.  See UK Parliament—Parliamentary Committees—Commons Select 
Committees, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/parliamentary_committees16.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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The American system, by contrast, ties so much of the party policy 
ambition of younger political operatives to the presidential transition 
process.  If an aspiring policy wonk—say, in her early 30‘s or late 20‘s—
receives a position in a presidential administration, it will define the rest of 
her career.  When her party resumes control of the White House, she will be 
first in line for more senior positions in the new administration.  When her 
party does not control the White House, she will be first in line for the rela-
tively few opposition positions, either as one of the few committee staffers 
that minority members of congressional committees are provided, or for one 
of the even fewer positions at a think tank or advocacy group.47   
But if these younger operatives do not receive a position in a presiden-
tial administration, they face a more precarious predicament.  They will lose 
out on a chance to occupy one of the very few opposition positions, because 
they will not have the policy leadership credentials that their colleagues 
who had served in an Administration have.  That is why so many members 
of losing presidential campaigns are forced to leave politics altogether to 
head to the worlds of law firms, business consulting, and other private sec-
tor positions.  If Bill Clinton had not won election in 1992, or reelection in 
1996, an entire generation of Democratic Party policy leaders (like Susan 
Rice) would have had a more difficult time competing for the few opposi-
tion positions in places like the Senate or think tanks; and, come Obama‘s 
victory, would have moved to the back of the line in the competition for 
policy positions in the Obama Administration.  They might instead have 
had to leave politics. 
It should be said that much of the reason for the difference between the 
permanent model of political party policy leadership and the American 
presidential transition model stems from the structural differences between 
parliamentary regimes and semi-presidential and presidential regimes.  In 
parliamentary systems, it might not be surprising that there is a shadow cab-
inet, because voters vote for a party—and all of the personnel and programs 
of that party—rather than voting for an individual person as happens in 
semi-presidential or presidential systems.  In presidential systems like the 
United States‘, voters cast a ballot for a singular official as well.  That offi-
cial therefore does not have the same need to define who his party‘s leaders 
are, since the voter is casting a ballot for that person and not that person‘s 
party. 
But this does not explain most of the differences between the American 
model and the model of the world‘s other major constitutional democracies.  
As mentioned before, even in semi-presidential systems like France or pres-
idential systems like Argentina, sometimes the opposition party will clearly 
 
 
 
47
  One study found that about eighty percent of high-level political appointees had prior experience 
in the federal government.  See Carl Brauer, Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovenment Employment Trends 
of Presidential Appointees, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES AND TRANSIENT 
GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON 174, 177 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 1987).   
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identify who their policy leaders are so that they can fill the larger number 
of opposition positions in government (as committee chairs, for instance).  
And, even in other presidential democracies the new President does not 
make anywhere near the number of appointments that the American Presi-
dent has to make.  In other words, for many reasons and on many levels, the 
regime used in the United States to select policy leaders is distinctively 
American. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States might still think of itself as different from the rest of 
the world, and even exceptional.  When it comes to constitutional structure 
and related political structure—the manner in which we allocate authority 
between our institutions—the United States is still different in many impor-
tant respects.  Perhaps the most salient aspect of our difference is how our 
major political parties select their current and future policy leaders.  The 
predominant model in the other major constitutional democracies of the 
world, of all forms, is to permanently define and coronate members of par-
ties to lead their parties‘ efforts on certain policies.  In the United States, 
though, so much of this process is wrapped up in the uniquely American 
drama of the presidential transition—a drama that begins on election day 
and continues even after the presidential inauguration. 
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